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**The Nation Development Unit:
An Army Responsibility?**

**A Monograph
by
Major Donald A. Osterberg
Infantry**



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**School of Advanced Military Studies
United States Army Command and General Staff College
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Current U.S. programs (both civil and military) are outlined to demonstrate the convoluted and bureaucratic nature of our foreign and security assistance programs. Based on the conclusion that our current systems are dysfunctional, I propose the development of a nation development unit as a major subordinate command under each unified CINC.


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
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
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

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ABSTRACT

THE NATION DEVELOPMENT UNIT -- AN ARMY RESPONSIBILITY? by Major Donald A. Osterberg, USA, 54 pages.

This monograph discusses the recent changes in the Warsaw Pact threat and the resultant impact upon U.S. military strategy. The paper outlines the requirement for the Army to look for new and innovative ways to establish itself as a viable element of national power in a world with diverse challenges to our national security. The study suggests that the means by which the Army can establish itself as a strategic force is through the development of capabilities to prosecute military operations short of war (MOSW).

The concept of an operational continuum is discussed as the basis for increasing military involvement in support of regional peaceful competition which requires an enhanced non-combat capability. The concept of Airland Battle-Future 2004 is reviewed as the point of departure for outlining a regional focus for future military strategy.

Current U.S. programs (both civil and military) are outlined to demonstrate the convoluted and bureaucratic nature of our foreign and security assistance programs. Based on the conclusion that our current systems are dysfunctional, I propose the development of a nation development unit as a major subordinate command under each unified CINC.

The concept of nation development is discussed from a military perspective, primarily to provide a meaningful capability to support peace throughout the world. The study concludes that nation development units would enhance regional stability and improve operational readiness by developing a military infrastructure upon which contingency forces could be projected to facilitate a smooth transition from regional peaceful competition to conflict or war if required.

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I. Introduction.

In response to the end of the cold war and other dramatic world changes, the United States must be prepared to radically change its military strategy.¹ In the future the reduced threat of a Warsaw Pact attack in Europe will force the military away from its current focus on a forward-deployed strategy to a primary focus on contingency operations and military operations short of war (MOSW).² The evolving U.S. military strategy will require forces which are capable of defending U.S. and other allied interests by defeating enemy military forces, while developing the capability to prosecute operations short of war.³ The Army of the future must be proficient in both combat and non-combat operations.⁴ The key to success in this type environment will be versatile, balanced and modernized forces optimized and tailored for the highest probability missions.⁵

Authors of the Army's Airland Battle Future study suggest that for the Army, this environment mandates flexibility to facilitate the application of a broad range of manpower and skills, not simply combat arms. "Army operations may run the gamut from assisting the development of third world nations to defeating enemy land forces."⁶

The effective transition of the Army to a force capable of operations across the entire operational continuum of peace, conflict and war will require an open-minded approach and a great deal of non-traditional thinking. The military in the

past has shown little imagination in this regard. Many continue to believe that soldiers trained to operate in the battlefields of Europe are by design capable of operating effectively in any other place under any conditions.⁷ In the past, the U.S. military's view of conflict and war through a "Fulda Gap" paradigm has made it difficult to develop special capabilities and organizations to meet the threat of unconventional or low intensity conflict.⁸ Our efforts to address the problems of low intensity conflict utilizing existing programs and capabilities have often resulted in a disjointed and ill-focused series of civil and military actions.⁹

The required changes at the strategic level will be significant and will include force design and doctrinal restructuring; however, the focus of this study will be the force structure changes required to facilitate effectiveness in military operations short of war (MOSW) at the theater level and below. Since regional conflicts will predominate in the foreseeable future, proposed force structure changes will be analyzed based upon the anticipated impact at the unified command or theater level.

In the future, unified, sub-unified and contingency force commanders will be increasingly challenged with the requirement to synchronize multiple units (and civilian agencies) simultaneously executing at different levels along the operational continuum. Short duration, conventional

military operations, such as those used in Grenada and Panama, will become less attractive and hopefully unnecessary. Protracted operations will become the norm, requiring the sequencing of agencies and military forces to progressively escalate from regional peaceful competition (RPC) to conflict (if appropriate).¹⁰ Unified commanders will, more than ever, be required to bridge the gap between often ambiguous strategic objectives and supporting tactical and civil operations. It is critical, in my opinion, that the military quickly recognize the substantive changes to our military threats and develop a forward-looking and innovative approach to force structuring which aborts the "business as usual" attitude which often pervades our thought process.

Many military personnel first responded to the changing military threat in Europe by warning that the actual capabilities of the Warsaw Pact have not been significantly decreased. The changes, some suggested, actually represented a calculated ruse on the part of the "evil empire" to disguise an offensively-oriented, force modernization program. Thus the Warsaw Pact threat in Europe was actually increasing rather than decreasing. However, the Warsaw Pact continued to crumble and the policy of Glastnost opened up the Soviet Union to reveal a nation economically distressed and sincerely desiring change.¹¹

General Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff suggests that:

... we are in an entirely new era which requires us to make sure that we are doing the best we can for the future, and that we start to reshape and restructure the armed forces in a very sensible, deliberate, coherent way down to a smaller armed force, but which will continue to serve our national interests with no increased risk.¹²

General Powell acknowledges that in the future there will be less emphasis on preparing for a high intensity conventional conflict in Europe since the intent of Warsaw Pact forces seem quite benign.¹³ The resultant military strategy will drive the development of forces which are smaller, lighter, rapidly deployable and sufficiently lethal to serve as a deterrent in an environment where military threats are difficult if not impossible to quantify. General Powell calls it the "superpower-lives-here" deterrent.¹⁴

... at some point, no matter what has happened in Eastern Europe, no matter what has happened in the Soviet Union, because a superpower lives here in the United States, you have to have the forces if necessary to demonstrate that presence around the world.¹⁵

In response to an unquantifiable threat and in consonance with the notion of a "superpower lives here", the U.S. military must develop a force structure which provides the capability to promote regional stability and the means to project credible military power worldwide. This will require capabilities which the military does not currently possess.¹⁶ A review of contingency operations is required to

ensure that unified commanders have the assets necessary to effectively execute all major operations within their overarching campaign plan.

In MOSW, perhaps the most important and complex major operations of a campaign are the pre-hostilities and post-hostilities civil affairs operations. Brigadier General William Hartzog, J-3, U.S. Southern Command said after the Panama invasion that "civil-military operations are a critical phase in every campaign plan" and that "civil-military operations provide the bridge between combat operations and long term nation development and stability."¹⁷ Yet, in operation JUST CAUSE, due to a lack of capability within the active component Army, reserve component civil affairs and psychological warfare personnel were called upon to volunteer their services to create an ad hoc civil-military operations task force under the theater special operations command (SOC), to execute what was arguably the most critical phase of the campaign plan.¹⁸

Although a significant civil affairs and psychological operations capability exists in the reserve component, the nature of contingency operations will continue to argue against their mobilization. Considering the negative reaction to the request for reserve component mobilization during the Vietnam War and the realities of partisan politics, it is unlikely that reserve component units would ever be activated for contingency operations.¹⁹ Our recent

experiences in Grenada, Iran, Libya, and Panama suggest that the most likely response to a low intensity conflict or show of force contingency will be an all active component package. Currently within the active component, there is only one civil affairs battalion and one psychological operations battalion. This reality supports General Hartzog's conclusion that "there is an extraordinary lack of knowledge of civil affairs and psychological operations in the active Army."²⁰

The Army, since it potentially has the most to lose in upcoming budget battles, has been alone among the services in pursuing a forward-looking strategy in recognition of imminent changes in national and military strategy.²¹ The Army's Airland Battle Future (ALB-F) Umbrella Concept represents an excellent first step in the evolution of our changing military strategy from its current focus on high intensity conflict in Europe, toward military capabilities across the operational continuum of peace, conflict and war. ALB-F mandates that in order to develop acceptable capabilities for future military roles, the Army must field forward-deployed forces and contingency forces while possessing nation development and unique mission capabilities within each designated theater.²² Therefore, in this study I will propose the establishment of an active component nation development unit which will be assigned to each theater on a permanent basis. The primary purpose of

the nation development unit is to provide the assets necessary to support regional peaceful competition and establish the infrastructure necessary to facilitate a smooth transition to conflict and war if necessary.

In this study, I will briefly review the dynamic world situation and the resultant changes necessary in our military strategy. Based upon reasonable assumptions about military strategy, I will analyze a force design which supports regional peaceful competition. The proposed structure of the nation development unit will utilize the concept of force packaging and module integration designed to assist the unified commander in preparing for military operations short of war.²³ The result of this study will be a recommendation for changes in Army force structure which will facilitate a coherent approach to military operations short of war.

Although the mission of nation development may become a joint responsibility, the Army has traditionally taken the lead in civil affairs and psychological operations and is perhaps the most institutionally predisposed of all the services to develop the capability to support this critical mission.²⁴

The following criteria will be used in this study to determine the effectiveness of the nation development unit to fulfill its anticipated role in MOSW:

1. Support Foreign Internal Defense (FID).
 - a. Development assistance.

- b. Humanitarian assistance.
- c. Security assistance.
- 2. Provide infrastructure for contingency forces.
 - a. Unique mission capable.
 - HUMINT network.
 - Language and regional/sub-regional/country cultural expertise.
 - Discriminate engagement capability (measured/flexible response).
 - b. C3I infrastructure to support contingency operations.
 - c. In depth regional intelligence network.
- 3. Provide resourceful and self-sufficient units.
- 4. Ensure functions/skills are tailorable to benefit host nation.

II. The Concept of Operational Continuum.

In the introduction, I mentioned several times the term operational continuum. Operational continuum is more than a model to describe what in our earlier lexicon was referred to as the "spectrum of conflict." The concept of operational continuum outlines the interrelationships of all elements of national power toward a common strategic goal.²⁵ When viewed as a concept, the operational continuum mandates an increased role for the military in support of regional peaceful competition as well as their traditional role in conflict and

war.

Generally speaking, U.S. peacetime strategy seeks to deter aggression and coercion against the United States and its allies.²⁶ In conflict, the strategy changes to the protection of U.S. and allied interests while attempting to preclude or limit the direct use of combat forces. As situations escalate toward war, the strategic goal again shifts to ending the war quickly on terms favorable to the U.S. and its allies.²⁷

As discussed earlier, the threats to U.S. national interests today are diverse and difficult to quantify. While the risk of war with the Soviet Union remains possible, its likelihood is highly improbable. The evolving threat to U.S. national interests include: regional conflicts, proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) and high technology weapons, international terrorism, narcotics trafficking, radical politico-religious movements, and third world instability.²⁸ In response to these diverse threats to U.S. national interests, the contemporary strategic environment can best be understood through the operational continuum which consists of three conditions: peace, conflict and war (Figure 1).²⁹

Peace is defined as nonmilitary competition between states and other organized powers. Competition among foreign powers is inevitable in peace; however, peaceful competition may promote conditions that lead to conflict.³⁰

Conflict is defined as a politico-military

struggle short of conventional armed action between states or other organized parties. It is often protracted and usually confined to a geographic region, but may have global implications. The parties to a conflict often use military power in a strategically indirect manner to support or counter subversion, sabotage, terrorism and insurgency. However, they can also use military power directly in short-duration, limited-objective contingency operations.³¹

War is defined as conventional or unconventional, or nuclear armed action between states or other organized parties. It may include any of the actions described in conflict, above. War may be general, involving national survival and the total resources of nations. More commonly, however, war is limited, with restraints on resources and objectives.³²

It is recognized that in situations short of war, nonmilitary elements of national power are the primary means to achieve national security objectives.³³ However, the concept of operational continuum sets the stage for increased military involvement during peacetime in order to deter conflict, or transition to conflict and war should the situation dictate.

Recent world activities suggest a decline in superpower influence, increased economic interdependence among nations, and greater diffusion of military technology. Although the world is enjoying greater peace today than at any time in recent history, our dynamic world situation and the creation of a multi-polar international environment may result in increased political violence and instability in a world burdened with uncertainty, unpredictable threats and

protracted, indirect conflicts.³⁴ Rather than focusing on a "peace dividend," it has become increasingly clear that the United States must focus on developing a credible and competent military to provide a full range of options to the National Command Authority to protect our divergent national interests. The Airland Battle Future study initiated by the Army recognizes the changing threat and represents a significant first step toward understanding the future military roles across the entire operational continuum.

III. Airland Battle Future Umbrella Concept.

As suggested earlier, ALB-F envisions a need for four types of forces: forward-deployed, contingency, nation development, and unique mission forces.

Forward-Deployed. In areas of great strategic importance, it is essential that military forces be forward-deployed in order to support strategic deterrence and facilitate regional balance of power. A credible force capable of fighting deep, close, and rear tactical and operational missions is critical in order to buy time to facilitate the mobilization and deployment of reserve force reinforcements. In addition to forward-deployed forces, as politically motivated force reductions in Europe and Korea continue, Army contingency forces will become increasingly critical as a means of power projection.³⁵

Contingency. In addition to reinforcing forward-deployed

forces, contingency forces must be capable of rapidly deploying into potential trouble spots to control crisis situations and restore unsatisfactory regional balance of power in parts of the world where there are no forward-deployed forces. Contingency forces must be tailorable and rapidly deployable to meet the broad range of future military threats which will likely face our nation. Contingency forces, as in the past, will be used to achieve shock effect while seizing the initiative to control the crisis, stop the conflict, influence decisions, and buy additional time for diplomatic negotiations or for further U.S. military build-up. Essential to the success of contingency forces is their ability to make a significant impact by winning quickly to deny the enemy the use of his reserves or to employ his exploitation forces.³⁶

Nation Development. Perhaps most important and least understood of the Army's future roles is in the area of nation development. Nation development efforts will be directed by the National Command Authority and will require the Army to respond to nonmilitary instruments of our government. Nation development operations are designed to facilitate regional balance and enhance the security of supported nations from both external and internal threats. In nation development, a small investment in manpower can reap tremendous strategic payoff by allowing the U.S. to gain the strategic initiative through the indirect application of

military forces.³⁷ Forward deployed and contingency forces may be able to provide some aspects of nation development support such as transportation, medical, engineer, and combat training; however, in order to be successful, theater commanders must have assigned to their commands sufficient assets to provide the preponderance of nation development support.

Critical to success in nation development is an in depth understanding of the mission and regional, sub-regional and country cultures which can only be accomplished by specialists permanently assigned to the region.³⁸ In contrast, contingency forces operating for only short duration can be expected to adhere to the old American tradition of "cutting the native's feet to fit the American shoe." What is required are theater forces capable of providing long-term support, tailorable to the needs and cultures of the supported nation or region. Therefore, future force structure changes should build this capability within each theater. In support of nation development operations (as with forward deployed and contingency operations), unique mission (special operations) support will be routinely required.

Unique Mission. Army forces will be required to refine the capability to conduct unique mission operations across the entire operational continuum while complementing regional combat and noncombat operations. Special operations forces

may be required to execute direct action missions normally involving specific, limited-focus actions with a discriminative engagement (surgical strike) capability. Unconventional warfare operations are included in the category of unique missions.³⁹

Although changes will be required to ensure effectiveness in all four types of operations discussed above, the Army seems institutionally disposed to understand and provide meaningful capabilities in forward-deployed, contingency operations and unique mission support. What the Army undoubtedly will have problems understanding and executing is its projected role in nation development and military operations short of war (MOSW).⁴⁰ Therefore, in the balance of this study, I will focus primarily on the nature of future Army roles in this area. My subsequent force structure proposal will provide the assets required to ensure a coherent approach to nation development. Under my proposal, military responsibility for nation development will be fixed with the nation development unit commander (or his designated representative) which will provide for a single point of contact to facilitate the coordination and synchronization of military operations short of war (MOSW) and the efforts of other nonmilitary agencies performing nation building within a unified CINCs area of responsibility.

ALB-F suggests that two environments exist in which MOSW are conducted. One is routine peaceful competition (RPC) and

the other is conflict. RPC is the normal situation where each nation pursues its national self-interests. Although the word peaceful is used in the label, RPC may not always be harmonious; however, the violence that occurs will generally be characterized as unorganized and unfocused. "When organized violence is introduced, the strategic environment and operational continuum changes from RPC to conflict."⁴¹ Conflict will generally be characterized by the use of a mix of regular and irregular forces. It is important to note that even combat missions in support of MOSW primarily support political, economic, and psychological efforts to achieve national objectives "without recourse to war."⁴²

The regional assessments conducted as part of the ALB-F study concluded that MOSW and unique mission support will predominate in most theaters in the foreseeable future.⁴³ Discussions in the ALB-F Umbrella Concept help to focus this study by declaring that:

... since the regional assessments clearly support the view that MOSW is quantitatively and qualitatively different from the more traditional forms of armed conflict, it follows that the requisite modifications of doctrine, training, leadership, force structure and materiel also must be both qualitative and quantitative in nature.⁴⁴

The first step in beginning to understand the nature of required changes will be the recognition and institutional acceptance of the difference between our traditional enemies and our enemies in MOSW. In MOSW, we might expect the enemy to fight indirectly by subverting a U.S. supported

government. In these cases, military objectives will usually involve actions to influence popular opinion rather than the application of direct combat forces.⁴⁵ Actions aimed toward modifying behavior and influencing changes in human rights and civil-military relations will be executed far more frequently than decisive combat operations.

A number of organizational requirements will result from the trend toward a smaller, more compact, deployable, tailorable and mobile Army designed to increase the military and nonmilitary options available to the National Command Authority.⁴⁶ The success of future Army forces during contingency operations will be greatly enhanced by an in place military infrastructure within the area of operation. Therefore, nation development units must be designed to provide a functional and expandable command and control system which enables the CINC to establish the linkages which incorporate all elements of U.S. national power. Additionally, nation development units must be designed and trained to provide multi-functional, area-oriented capabilities to each unified CINC. In order to appreciate the extent of the required changes in force structure, it is important to understand the existing programs for providing foreign and security assistance.

IV. Current Organizations and Programs for Foreign and Security Assistance.

In this section I will briefly outline existing programs and principles for Internal Defense and Development (IDAD) and Foreign Internal Defense (FID). Internal Defense and Development (IDAD) is a strategy which encompasses the full range of actions taken to promote the growth of a nation while protecting it against subversion and insurgency. The focus of the strategy is on the development of viable political, economic, military, and social institutions which respond to the needs of society.⁴⁷ Existing programs for IDAD mandate support in the following general areas:

1. Balanced Development.
 - Political
 - Economic
 - Social
2. Neutralization of insurgency threat.
 - Remove causes for discontent
 - Destroy insurgent forces
3. Security.
 - Population protection
4. Mobilization.
 - Psychological operations
 - Civil affairs programs⁴⁸

Foreign Internal Defense programs support the IDAD strategy and call for assistance in the following major

functional areas:

1. Development assistance.
2. Humanitarian assistance.
3. Security assistance.
4. Military assistance program (MAP).
5. Internal military education and training program.
6. Foreign military sales program.

Types of support provided through the above programs include:

Training assistance

Advisory assistance

Intelligence operations

Psychological operations

Civil affairs operations

Populace and resource control

Limited tactical operations

- Mobility

- Fire support

Public health assistance

Displaced civilian control operations

Public education

Command information program

Civic action programs (Engineer construction)⁴⁹

For the purpose of this study I will not challenge the basic principles of either our IDAD or FID strategies. I will, however, suggest a structure which recognizes the military's role in support of regional peace, requiring

synchronized and continuous civil-military cooperation, rather than the current system which tends to result in civil actions followed sequentially by the introduction of combat forces to resolve a situation which has gotten out of control. The current IDAD concept ostensibly integrates civil and military programs, although the actual synchronization of U.S. agencies in support of nation building is often dubious at best.⁵⁰

The current national system for providing foreign and security assistance is complex and convoluted. The Department of State is tasked to provide direction, coordination and supervision of U.S. interdepartmental activities.⁵¹ At the national level the agencies that direct and coordinate U.S. foreign assistance programs include:

- The Department of State
- The National Security Council
- The Central Intelligence Agency
- The U.S. Information Agency⁵²

A planning and coordination organization is established at the national level to provide long-range planning to ensure regional stability and continued routine peaceful competition. Five separate offices covering psychological operations, information, economic, social, and political affairs represent their parent national-level agencies. They each develop operational concepts and policies for inclusion in the national plan.⁵³ Agencies providing foreign

assistance primarily focus on nonmilitary support.

As with foreign assistance, the Department of State coordinates policies, plans and programs for all governmental agencies involved in security assistance. Separate national level organizations exist to provide security assistance to foreign nations. The chief agencies involved in providing security assistance are:

- The Department of State
- The Arms Transfer Management Group
- The Department of Defense
- The U.S. Diplomatic Mission⁵⁴

In an area where an active insurgency exists, and at the discretion of the Director of the National Planning and Coordination Center (directly subordinate to the chief executive), a sub-national, state or local level area coordination center (ACC) may be established to function as a combined civil-military headquarters to plan, coordinate, and exercise operational control over all military forces. Area coordination centers are headed by a senior government official who coordinates with:

- Area military commands.
- Area police agencies.
- Local and national intelligence organizations.
- Public information and PSYOP agencies.
- Paramilitary forces.

- Other local and national government offices involved in the economic, social, and political aspects of IDAD.⁵⁵

Area coordination centers do not replace military tactical operations centers or normal government administrative organizations in the area of operations. However, they must possess a continuous operations capability, and communications designed to provide integrated planning, direction and coordination for all counterinsurgency efforts.⁵⁶

The Department of Defense organization for providing security assistance is shown at Figure 2.⁵⁷ The Department of Defense exercises its security assistance functions through the following staff organizations:

- Under secretary of defense for policy
- Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA)
- Joint Chiefs of Staff
- Unified commands
- Service component commands
- Security assistance organizations
- Security assistance forces
- Military departments⁵⁸

Military resources are provided to support foreign nations in the context of Foreign Internal Defense (FID). Military support to FID is provided through the unified CINC, who under current organizations has only an indirect role in

security assistance activities.⁵⁹ Military resources are generally provided through a security assistance organization which is a part of the Country Team (Figure 3).⁶⁰ The security assistance organization assists host nation security forces by planning and administering the military aspects of the security assistance program. The security assistance organization is a joint organization which represents all U.S. armed forces organizations that have security assistance responsibilities in an assigned region.⁶¹ The chief of the security assistance organization is responsible to three different authorities: the ambassador (who heads up the Country Team), the unified CINC, and the director of the Defense Security Assistance Agency.⁶² Although there is no standard organization for a security assistance organization, a typical organization is shown at Figure 4.⁶³

Security assistance forces (SAF) are often organized to augment security assistance organizations. Security assistance force organizations consist of a headquarters element and supporting civil affairs, psychological operations forces, combat, combat support and combat service support elements tailored to requirements (see Figure 5).⁶⁴

In spite of superb efforts by many personnel and governmental agencies to execute nation building, existing foreign and security assistance systems often result in disjointed action, due primarily to systemic problems resulting from dysfunctional organization structures.⁶⁵

Although it is unlikely that the military will be able to effect significant changes in U.S. national level organizations, changes in military support of security assistance programs is essential and achievable.

Organizations must be developed to provide unified commanders with a direct role in all security assistance activities. Unified CINCs must be provided with simple and standardized systems which integrate all security assistance plans with regional U.S. military plans to ensure consistency and continuity in support of regional peace. The CINCs regional perspective enables him to apply necessary resources to achieve U.S. strategic goals in his area of responsibility.

In order to facilitate the synchronization of security assistance efforts, a standardized nation development organization should be established under the direct command of the unified CINC. Based upon the previous discussion of existing security assistance systems, I will now assess the force structure requirements necessary to provide the military with a meaningful capability to support regional peace.

V. Force Structure Requirements.

Sun Tzu suggested nearly 2500 years ago that the "supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting."⁶⁶ As emerging strategic realities drive our military focus away from high intensity conflict in Europe toward the role of

supporting regional stability and routine peaceful competition in areas vital to U.S. national security interests, Sun Tzu's dictum may prove especially important. In counterinsurgency operations, the development of a credible governmental structure which is sensitive to the needs of the people, may preclude the conditions which foment support for an insurgency. When government operations are fairly and efficiently executed, the insurgent factions may be defeated without the use of armed military action. Enhanced capabilities in MOSW will enable the military to conduct a number of pre-crisis and non-escalatory measures to stabilize unsettled situations in order to preclude the necessity for combat operations.⁶⁷

The recognition of communism as a bankrupt ideology will not likely change the overarching policy of flexible response or preclude the requirement for a high intensity conventional capability; however, the military in the future will be required to expand its noncombat roles in order to serve as a strategic deterrence force and thus maximize the range of options available to the National Command Authority. As discussed earlier, the practice of allowing a volatile situation in a foreign country to degenerate to a point where direct military action is the only viable alternative will become increasingly unacceptable. The U.S. military must develop a strategy which precludes conflict through the fielding of a nation development or counterinsurgency

infrastructure. With a nation development infrastructure in place, support of regional peace would be enhanced, and the transition to conflict would be decidedly smoother through the interface and coordination between contingency forces (combat) and nation development units familiar with local terrain, cultures, language and enemy forces. The recent invasion of Panama is perhaps the most illuminating example of the benefits derived from having a functional military infrastructure in place upon which to receive and employ contingency forces when required.

Achieving the required level of military presence in many developing nations is not as easy as it may superficially appear. In a time of increasing anti-American sentiment within many developing nations, the presence of combat troops may serve as a source of agitation rather than stability.⁶⁸ Packaging is critical. The presence of medical personnel to assist in public health programs, engineers to provide civic action support through construction projects, as well as intelligence, special operations forces and civil affairs personnel to provide support for local governments, may be more readily accepted.

The regional assessments conducted as a part of the ALB-F Umbrella Concept served as the basis for my nation development force design proposal. In reviewing the ALB-F regional assessments I found more commonality than differences, therefore, the proposal for a basic and

standardized nation development unit has utility as the basis for developing a series of tailorable force packages designed to support routine peaceful competition.

The basic structure of the nation development unit is as shown in Figure 6. Under this proposal, a nation development unit headquarters and staff would be assigned to each unified CINC (with the possible exception of LANTCOM). The number of subordinate nation development brigades, task forces or teams, and the precise composition of each sub-unit would be tailored based upon regional, sub-regional and country assessments within each theater.

In theaters where language and cultural similarities predominate within the region (SOUTHCOM), nation development assets would normally be employed as brigades (as shown in Figure 6). In theaters where there are language and cultural dissimilarities within the CINC's area of responsibility, a country focus may be required (PACOM, CENTCOM). In these cases, multiple nation development task force and team sized organizations will be developed to provide the appropriate capability under the command of the CINC's nation development unit commander. In either case, the nation development brigade, task force or team commander (within each country) would serve as the chief of military mission and the security assistance officer on the corresponding Country Team. The commander of the nation development forces would be under the dual supervision of the Ambassador and the CINC's nation

development unit commander. The result would be a greater continuity of effort and a focused/integrated approach toward country and regional stability.

The critical capabilities, roles and operational imperatives for the nation development unit are listed below. It is important to understand that although nation building is the primary mission for the nation development unit, it also plays an important role in facilitating contingency operations if required.

Critical capabilities:

- Accurately assess the host nation's (HN) needs.
- Provide tailorable functions/skills which benefit HN.
- Conduct in depth regional intelligence collection.
- Possess a discriminate engagement capability.
- Provide medical, engineer, transportation, PSYOP, and Civil Affairs support to HN.

Characteristics:

- Flexible and adaptable.
- Resourceful and self-sufficient.
- Robust C2.

Roles:

- Enhance regional balance, security and stability.

- Limit conditions that would allow the expansion of U.S. adversaries.
- Provide favorable environment for HN objectives/programs.
- Prevent undesirable regional situations.
- Gain strategic initiative through the indirect application of U.S. military elements.
- Complement regional combat and non-combat operations.
- Provide land forces to support domestic defense security objectives of both civil and military authorities.
- Establish C3I infrastructure to support theater operations.
- Provide developmental, humanitarian and security assistance to NH.

Operational Imperatives:

- Interagency/interservice/interdepartment coordination of regional objectives and operations.
- Unity of command/effort.
- Recognition of military role in accomplishing political objectives in designated region.
- Simple, solid, long range C3I system support.⁶⁹

The nation development unit will be responsible for providing the military portions of developmental, security

and humanitarian assistance within the assigned theater. Developmental assistance has the goal of enhancing peaceful political, social and economic progress by helping local governments to meet the needs of the people.⁷⁰ Developmental assistance includes: medical services (treatment, preventive medicine and sanitation); engineer construction (roads, bridges, water projects, schools, electric power generation, government buildings etc); and civil affairs operations to improve the governmental infrastructure and operations.⁷¹ Hand in hand with security assistance, the military will support humanitarian assistance by providing disaster relief through the transport of food, clothing and shelter, as well as medical and engineering support as required.⁷² In addition to their supporting role in developmental and humanitarian assistance, the nation development unit will take the lead in providing security assistance to developing nations. Security assistance involves training regional military, paramilitary and police forces to provide for their own internal and external defense, including counter-narcotics, counterterrorism and counterinsurgency.⁷³

In addition to the assistance missions discussed above, the nation development unit may be tasked to provide protection for U.S. citizens and U.S. interests in the region, including the evacuation of non-combatants if routine peaceful competition degenerates into conflict.⁷⁴ In the event that hostage or prisoner rescue is required, the

unique mission and military intelligence elements within the nation development unit will either conduct the operation themselves or will assist contingency forces if required. In addition to serving as the base upon which to build a higher intensity capability, unique mission forces will be instrumental in supporting operations against illegal drug trafficking by providing training, communication and transportation support to host nation forces or through unilateral U.S. direct action.⁷⁵

I have already outlined the roles and capabilities of the nation development unit as a whole. At this point I will briefly discuss each major sub-unit within the nation development unit.

The civil affairs battalion is the backbone of the nation development unit. The primary mission of the civil affairs unit is to assist host nation military forces in mobilizing and motivating popular support for the government and military.⁷⁶ As mentioned earlier, civil affairs personnel must be regional experts, with cultural awareness and language proficiency being especially critical. Area expertise is essential for effective intercultural communications between U.S. and host country representatives.⁷⁷ The scope of civil affairs operations will vary from region to region (and country to country) based upon the capabilities of the host nation being supported. Economic, social, and political conditions will

also serve as major influences upon civil affairs activities. In most cases, however, civil affairs operations will include:

- Prevention of civilian interference with military operations (during conflict or war).
- Support of governmental functions.
- Community relations.
- Military civic action.
- Civil defense.
- Populace/resource control.⁷⁸

Another critical element of the nation development unit is the psychological operation (PSYOP) group, battalion, or company. During routine peaceful competition, PSYOP units support other governmental agencies and military forces in an overall effort to prevent conflict by helping to resolve crises without resorting to military force.⁷⁹ Propaganda, civic action programs and planning for rallies, marches and demonstrations are some of the ways in which PSYOP units provide support to host nation efforts.⁸⁰

Psychological operations shift emphasis quickly when it becomes clear that U.S. contingency forces will be deployed into a region either to conduct combat operations or as a show of force. The PSYOP goal will then focus on preparing the target country's population for the introduction of U.S. forces by explaining and seeking acceptance of U.S. goals and policies.⁸¹ During conflict, PSYOP forces possess the

capability to develop PSYOP-related intelligence, conduct target analysis and develop/disseminate propaganda products. Perhaps most important in military operations short of war is the PSYOP capability to stabilize the regional environment and promote goodwill by encouraging both hostile and friendly populations to cooperate.⁸²

The engineer element assigned to the nation development unit will consist primarily of construction engineers and will vary in size based upon the anticipated requirements within the theater. Engineers will support developmental and humanitarian assistance efforts (discussed earlier) through the construction of roads, bridges, water projects, electric power generation, waste disposal, schools, hospitals, government buildings etc.⁸³

The military intelligence element of the nation development unit is essential to establish an intelligence data base to support the host nation government in counter-insurgency, and to facilitate the smooth transition to conflict should U.S. contingency forces be required. The intelligence and electronic warfare (IEW) element will assist in the development of contingency plans for U.S. assistance through the development of an intelligence documentary data base.⁸⁴ Some military intelligence personnel will be required to provide assistance to paramilitary and nonmilitary elements of a host nation to develop HUMINT sources and exploit the information they

provide.⁸⁵ The intelligence system which supports the nation development unit incorporates all host nation and U.S. generated intelligence support. The national intelligence structure is established to direct information from all sources into a single channel.⁸⁶ This channel leads to a central body which is responsible for the production of a composite intelligence picture within the region.

Other intelligence missions in support of MOSW include:

- Determining intelligence objectives.
- Integrating local intelligence programs with host nation programs.
- Evaluating intelligence resources.
- Organizing and training for new intelligence activities.
- Formulating intelligence plans.
- Establishing priorities and allocating resources.
- Conducting an active liaison program.⁸⁷

As routine peaceful competition degenerates and contingency forces are required, the intelligence personnel from the contingency unit work with the combined intelligence elements already in place on a mutual support basis. Once conflict has been initiated and contingency forces have been introduced, the nation development unit will normally become a supporting command. Within the military intelligence element of the nation development unit, the focus will shift from an advisory role to an operational role, although those

intelligence functions already discussed will continue.

During conflict or war, the military intelligence element may assist in:

- Population and resource control.
- Tactical operations.
- Interrogation, materiel and document exploitation, and imagery analysis centers.⁸⁸

The medical detachment of the nation development unit will provide military health services units, personnel, and materials to support local civilian medical capabilities and disease control programs. As with the other major sub-elements of the nation development unit, the size of the medical detachment will be determined based upon specific requirements. Specific missions for the medical detachment of the nation development unit during MOSW may include:

- Medical command and control.
- Treatment.
- Dental services.
- Health service logistics.
- Blood bank services.⁸⁹

A transportation unit will be required to assist host nations in locating and procuring local transportation resources during routine peaceful competition. During the transition to conflict, the role of the transportation unit becomes increasingly critical through the preparation and execution of the Wartime Movement Program.⁹⁰ The Wartime

Movement Program is the focal point around which transportation support is designed. The program requires the preplanned movement of personnel and equipment to the area of operation, often augmented by host nation transportation assets.⁹¹ This early theater movement buys time for the establishment of the land, sea, and air lines of communication required to support contingency operations.

Unique mission or special operation forces are essential to the effectiveness of the nation development unit. Although a number of unique missions have already been discussed, the following is a summary of the most critical missions:

- C3I infrastructure.
- Facility protection.
- Hostage/prisoner rescue.
- Non-combatant evacuation.
- Counternarcotics.
- Counterterrorism.
- HUMINT.
- Local paramilitary and special operations training.⁹²

In addition to the major units already discussed, the nation development unit staff would require the following special staff elements/members:

- Staff judge advocate
- Chemical officer

- Communication-electronics officer
- Public affairs officer
- Comptroller
- Chaplain

The concept of a nation development unit would provide for a new operational command within each region. The command would be characterized by a forward-deployed force, flexible and adaptable based upon regional requirements, under a military commander. The organization has sufficient organic assets to provide a meaningful capability to support a broad range of nation development missions, while serving as an excellent means to project U.S. presence in regions vital to U.S. national interests.

VI. Conclusions.

There exists today no persistent, direct, high-level emphasis for the development of an interdepartmental approach to the problem of Foreign Internal Defense.⁹³ In the absence of a national security structural framework that addresses the interdepartmental obligations associated with FID operations, and considering the lack of incentives for organizational change within the military, it has been difficult for the military to recognize its responsibility to develop the capability to support peace throughout the world, especially in those areas where insurgencies threaten national and regional stability.⁹⁴

With the fielding of nation development units within each unified command, the current systems for foreign and security assistance would be streamlined with fewer organizations and a cleaner command and control structure to fix responsibility and monitor program execution. Unified commanders would be directly responsible for all military aspects of nation development within their area of responsibility. Nation development units would replace security assistance organizations (SAO) and security assistance forces (SAF) within the Department of Defense. Although Country Teams would continue to be used in nations with which the U.S. has diplomatic relations, I would propose that the chief of military mission (member of the Country Team) should be the commander of the nation development unit. With a nation development unit forward deployed in each theater, personnel with cultural awareness and language proficiency would be able to assess each country's needs and tailor support to facilitate regional stability and enhance the likelihood of sustained routine peaceful competition. The standardized unit model which I have proposed allows for a varied number of nation development brigades or task force organizations within the theater level nation development unit in order to provide for flexibility and adaptability consistent with anticipated mission requirements. The concept for a nation development command enables the unit to be more self-sufficient than would a series of agencies and

military staffs attempting to orchestrate nation building operations from the bowels of a unified headquarters or from Washington, D.C. In addition to its nation building mission, the nation development unit will assist in the transition to conflict through the use of unique mission forces.

The full time assignment of special operations forces to the unique mission unit would greatly enhance the HUMINT network and would serve as the base for a C3I infrastructure upon which to commit contingency forces as required. Unique mission forces would also preclude the requirement for contingency forces for small crises by possessing a discriminate engagement capability designed to provide an inherent measured and flexible military response through direct action operations.

The enhancement of regional stability, balance and security would limit the conditions which allow expansion by U.S. adversaries, thus enabling the U.S. to gain the strategic initiative through the indirect application of military forces. An indirect approach to MOSW will serve as an effective means to project military influence across the entire operational continuum.

When viewed as a whole, the concept of operational continuum suggests that the military should be involved in all three phases--not just conflict and war. To neglect any part of the continuum would significantly reduce the utility of our military as a viable instrument of national power in

the decades ahead.

Unified commanders must be given the assets necessary to effectively conduct civil-military operations in support of peace, in order to deter conflict. If conflict becomes necessary, an in place military infrastructure upon which to deploy contingency forces would facilitate a smooth transition and ensure a quick, decisive resolution of the conflict on terms favorable to the U.S..

The Goldwater-Nichols Act recognized the importance of the unified CINCs and their ability to provide consistent and responsible leadership and management, and has vested in them the responsibility for all U.S. military actions within their region (in coordination with country Ambassadors). It is time now for the Army to provide the capabilities and force structure to match the Congressionally mandated responsibilities the CINCs already have.

Under the current system of Internal Defense and Development and Foreign Internal Defense, multiple organizations and agencies within the Departments of State, Defense, Agriculture, Commerce, and Treasury (among others), share in the security assistance mission, which is administered by the Ambassador through the Country Team. Organizations such as the U.S. Information Agency, U.S. Agency for Internal Development, Country Teams, Area and Regional Coordination Centers, Security Assistance Organizations, U.S. Diplomatic Missions, and Unified Military

Commanders represent only a few of the strands which have been woven into an incomprehensible web of bureaucracy. As suggested earlier, the result of the current convoluted security assistance effort is usually a series of disjointed civil actions followed by the direct use of combat forces to protect U.S. national interests. In the past our approach to foreign and security assistance has been extremely expensive and in many cases counterproductive.

With impending budget cuts ahead, the Army has an unprecedented opportunity to restructure a force with the capability to support and sustain peace in the world. If the Army is to truly become a strategic force, the establishment of nation development units is an important first step by which to achieve the capability to support and defend vital U.S. national interests throughout the world.

Low-intensity warfare represents the most likely arena of future conflict for the military, and counterinsurgency the most demanding contingency. If we are to develop the required capability to conduct nation development as a major part of Foreign Internal Defense, it is critical that the military stop erecting barriers to avoid fighting another Vietnam and embrace the concept of nation development as a viable and important military mission.




Figure 1. Operational Continuum^{8,9}





Figure 2. DOD Organization for Security Assistance⁹⁰



FUNCTIONAL ALIGNMENT




Figure 4. Typical Security Assistance Organization⁹²




Figure 5. Security Assistance Force⁹³

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